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INTRODUCTION: THE SCIENTIFIC MOOD SWING WITH REGARD TO THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION 
 
The proliferation of Open Methods of Coordination (OMCs) at the turn of the century 
went hand in hand with a steady stream of scientific production on this topic. Initially 
m a n y  o f  t h e  w r i t i n g s  w e r e  q u i t e  s u p p o r t i v e  o f  t h i s  n e w  m o d e  o f  s o f t  g o v e r n a n c e ,  
which was at some point even attributed “revolutionary potential” (Tucker, 2003). 
However, “The initial praise for the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) – both by 
politicians and scientists – has recently turned into scepticism” (Schäfer, 2006: 2).  
 
The academic community has indeed taken a far more critical stance towards open 
coordination, which is now found to be ‘weak and ineffective’ and thus a ‘paper 
tiger’, since according to a majority of scholars its value added has not been 
demonstrated sufficiently. The ‘delivery gap’ of the OMC to which is often referred 
would be predictable in view of the “weakness of the peer pressure system” 
(Collignon  et al., 2005) and, more generally, the ‘design flaws’ of the process. 
Coordination processes are therefore dismissed as ‘rhetoric and cheap talk’ which 
appear ‘remote and irrelevant’. Or worse: the OMC may even be a ‘fashionable red 
herring’ which distracts the attention from other, more relevant issues. Some scholars 
have noticed the irony of the term ‘open’ method of coordination, which is perceived 
as being much more closed than the Community method (Jacobsson and Vifell, 
2003:23). Thus, due to its ‘lack of transparency and pluralism’, the OMC should 
instead be labelled a ‘closed method of coordination’ or even an “open method of 
centralisation” (Smismans, 2004:15) which is supposed to be “exiting to a small group 
of experts, yet ignored by the rest of the world” (Tsoukalis, 2006). Quite recently “hot 
air” and “Christmas tree” were added to the list of nicknames (Dehousse, 2007). 
 
Many more examples could be given, but the general picture is clear: the OMCs have 
been weighed on the scales and found wanting by mainstream academic literature. 
These sceptical views seems to be in sharp contrast with the views expressed by many 
actors involved in the Open method of Coordination on Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion. Indeed, the general picture emerging from a (formal) large-scale evaluation 
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1 is that most of the actors involved in the social protection OMCs 
are critical, but at the same time they (strongly) support these processes (European 
Commission, 2005). This conclusion is corroborated by (informal) interviews with 
individual civil servants and social partner representatives from the 10 new Member 
States (CEEC) (Vanhercke, 2007). In other words, those involved in the OMC have also 
weighed it on the scales, but have not at all found it wanting. Finally, the 
abovementioned academic views seem to contrast with a recent Report from the 
European Parliament, in which the Committee on Legal Affairs warns against the 
“indirect legal effects” of soft law which is “liable to circumvent the influence of the 
other (democratic) instruments” and would “allow the executive effectively to 
legislate by means of soft-law instruments, thereby potentially undermining the 
Community legal order” (European Parliament, 2007:4-5). 
 
The remainder of this paper will be devoted to piecing the empirical puzzle that 
emerges from the previous paragraphs: on the hand, the outright sceptical views with 
regard to the OMC held by recent mainstream academic literature; on the other hand 
continued (and potentially increasing) suppor t  f o r  t h i s  m e t h o d  f r o m  m a n y  o f  t h e  
actors who are involved in it. More particularly, we will develop one possible 
explanation for the continuing support of many actors, namely the hypotheses that 
the actors experience that this ‘soft’ mode of governance is quite a bit harder, and 
much more useful, in practice than they had thought, or than most academics seem to 
grasp so far. 
 
We try to provide empirical evidence to solve this puzzle, by looking at the actual 
operation in a Belgian context of one of the OMC’s, namely the Social Protection and 
Social Inclusion OMC (SPSI OMC), and more particularly its Social Inclusion strand. In 
the next section, we will begin by briefly developing a theoretical perspective which 
we see as fit to assess the OMC effectiveness at the national level. In section 2 we will 
describe, for each of the dimensions of the theoretical framework, whether there is 
any evidence of ‘real’ impact in Belgium.  
 
1.  ASSESSING THE OMC EFFECTIVENESS AT NATIONAL LEVEL: THE ‘LEGALIZATION’ AND 
‘NEWGOVERNMENTALIST’ PATHWAYS 
 
We will try to capture the different kinds of potential impact of the OMC by integrating 
them, as far as possible, in a theoretical framework which will be explained in this 
section. This seems essential since our key hypothesis to explain the remarkable 
variation in the support for this OMC between academics and the actors involved, is that 
the OMC Social Protections and Social Inclusion is more ‘effective’ then is normally 
assumed. We will start from the concept of “legalization” as developed by Abbott et al. 
(2000). While proving a useful perspective, we consider that this “rationalist” 
theoretical framework only allows capturing one dynamic along which the OMC may 
impact at national level. Therefore, we will complement the legalization framework 
                                         
1 Which included all member States, but also European-level social partner bodies, and a large number 
of European-level NGO’s and representatives of other actors (European Commission, 2005). 
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effectiveness. Taken together, these dynamics seem to captures the reality of 
institutionalization more fully
2. 
 
Abbott and colleagues delineate three dimensions of legalization: obligation, precision 
and delegation. Any institution can, according to the authors, be described in terms of 
these three dimensions of legalization. 
 
How are these dimensions defined then?  
 
Obligation, first of all, refers to the degree in which states or other actors are bound by 
a rule or commitment or by a set of rules or commitments (Ibid: 401). Given that we are 
discussing international public law, in practical terms this category demands a measure 
for the subjective acceptance by states of a particular rule as a legal rule or not, i.e. as 
binding or non-binding as a matter of international law (Radulova, 2007: 12).  
 
Precision is the extent to which rules unambiguously define the conduct they require, 
authorize, or proscribe (Abbott et al., 2000: 401). A precise rule specifies clearly and 
unambiguously what is expected of a state or other actor (in terms of both the intended 
objective and the means of achieving it) in a particular set of circumstances. Precision 
also implies that the rules are related to one another in a non-contradictory way, 
creating a framework within which case-by-case interpretation can be coherently 
carried out. In other words: precision narrows the scope for reasonable interpretation 
(Ibid: 412-413).  
 
Delegation, the third dimension of legalization, is the degree to which states and other 
actors delegate authority to designated third parties—including courts, arbitrators, and 
administrative organizations—to implement agreements, to interpret, and apply the 
rules to particular facts; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules” 
(Ibid:401; 415). Following Abbott and Snidal, I will make a distinction between 
‘managerial’ delegation i.e. the power to apply and elaborate agreed rules, and 
‘enforcement’ delegation i.e. the power to evaluate, judge and sanction performance 
(Abbott and Snidal, 2000: 430). 
 
Even though this conceptualization of institutionalization already seems to capture some 
important dimensions of institutionalization (OMC effectiveness), we consider that two 
others should be added to this theoretical framework, namely “commitment”, 
“participation” and “revision”.  
 
Let us first turn our attention to commitment. It seems crucial to acknowledge that 
institutions may change, not because of the legal obligation to do so, but as a 
consequence of “subjective” acceptance, or strategic use, of given rules or norms. This 
may happen for many reasons other than their legal status: concern about reciprocity, 
                                         
2 The concept of legalization is understood by Abbott and colleagues as a particular form of 
institutionalization (Ibid:401) 
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material considerations, all play a role. In order to reflect this subjective commitment 
of certain actors to ‘deliver the goods’, independent from their legal obligation to do 
so, we see “commitment” as a first addition to the legalisation framework. 
 
It can be argued, secondly, that the active participation in a rulemaking process of a 
broad range of stakeholders increases the likelihood of the rules being effectively 
institutionalized. Thus, “The diffusion of procedural commitments to transparency and 
participation in EU networked governance has had democratizing destabilizing effect in 
terms of stimulating demands to widen the circle of actors and alternatives involved in 
policy-making at the national as well as the European level” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 
2006:64). While we consider the procedural requirements for ensuring active 
participation in decision-making by a broad range of non-state and subnational 
stakeholders - including civil society associations and NGOs as well as industry bodies, 
social partners and other interested parties - as an important indication for active 
participation, we see transparency as a necessary foundation for it.  
 
A third dimension we consider to have been omitted from the legalization framework in 
order to get a full grip on the effectiveness of the OMC, is the scope for revision that is 
being provided for in EU-level framework making. This dimension of institutionalization 
refers to the room for manoeuvre available to actors to revise institutional 
arrangements as they apply them. It has been argued indeed that that any decision-
making process (both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’) is to some (but in a varying) degree 
deliberative: actor’s initial preferences are transformed through discussion by the force 
of the better argument. In other words: “consensus is regarded as provisional, a 
necessary condition for taking decisions that have to be confronted now, but certainly 
not the final word of discussion” (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2006:4). Thus, in complex areas of 
decision making “actors have to learn what problem they are solving, and what solution 
the are seeking, through the very process of problem-solving” (Ibid:46). To the extent 
that ‘along the road’ revision of the institutional arrangement allows to adapt the rules 
in use to the complex situation they apply to, “revision” seems indeed an important 
additional dimension of the institutionalization framework. 
 
Figure 1 summarises the two dynamics that could help us to explain the effectiveness of 
the OMC: obligation, precision and delegation are the key dimensions of the 
“legalization” pathway, while commitment, revision and participation are the main 
dimensions of the new governmentalist pathway. 
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LEGALIZATION         NEW  GOVERNMENTALIS   
P A T H W A Y           P A T H W A Y  
 
Obligation     <-------------------------------->   Commitment 
   
 
Precision     <-------------------------------->   Revision 
       
 
Delegation     <-------------------------------->   Participation  
             
FIGURE 1. Framing the effectiveness of Open Method of Coordination: the ‘legalization’ and 
‘newgovernmentalist’ pathways 
 
In the remainder of this paper, I will provide empirical evidence of the ‘effectiveness’ 
of the social protection and social inclusion OMC (SPSI OMC) following, first, the 
legalization pathway, and, second, the new governmentalist pathway. 
 
2.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL PROTECTION AND SOCIAL INCLUSION OMC IN 
BELGIUM 
 
a.  Obligation: delivering the goods through EU-SILC 
 
At the end of the nineties of last century, Belgium’s official statistical capacity with 
regard to poverty and social exclusion faced some real challenges. The national 
statistical institute (NIS) hardly possessed any know how in this area, and was 
completely dependent on two universities (Liège and Antwerp) to provide statistical 
information which the latter collected through the annual Panel Survey on Belgian 
Households (PSBH). Importantly, these universities made these Belgian national panel 
data available to EUROSTAT
3. The latter then adapted the data so that they would 
satisfy the requirements of, and could be integrated in, European Community 
Household Panel Study (ECHP)
4. It would be an understatement to say that the 
relationship between the Belgian national statistical institute and Eurostat was rather 
tense: for almost 5 years the NIS, informed by the Universities of Liège and 
(especially) Antwerp, contested the validity of the Belgian ECHP data, mainly because 
of the income imputation procedures followed by Eurostat
5. Eurostat, so the Belgian 
side claimed, significantly overestimated the risk of poverty in Belgium (CSB, 2002), 
which led to confusion and sharp national debates: depending on the source being 
used, Belgium performed between ‘very well” and ‘on average’ as compared to other 
                                         
3 EUROSTAT is the Statistical Office of the European Communities. 
4 Whereas in all but 2 countries ECHP-surveys were carried out using the harmonised ECHP 
questionnaire (blueprint questionnaire), in Belgium and the Netherlands ECHP data came from existing 
national panels(Atkinson et al, 2005: 55). 
5 Amongst others with regard to capital income and in case of within-household non-response (CSB, 
2002). 
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evolution of the poverty situation: according to Eurostat calculations poverty 
decreased over time, while the Belgian panel data indicated the contrary. In sum, 
Belgium faced a double challenge at the turn of the century: weak official statistical 
capacity and contested poverty and social exclusion indicators. 
 
During the second half of 2001, the situation changed in important ways, since the 
then adopted Action Programme on Social Inclusion boosted discussions on a new 
statistical tool which would replace, from 2003 onwards, the ECHP survey (European 
Parliament and Council of the EU, 2002). At that moment, the technical problems 
facing social statistical capacity in Belgium made there way to the political level. 
There are two main reasons for this: first, whereas the ECHP simply operated under a 
gentleman’s agreement, the new instrument, EU-SILC (Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions), was  being institutionalised in a very formal way, namely through a set of 
clear legal acts and implementation regulations (eg. a Framework Regulation of the 
European Parliament and the Council). Thus, the pressure to “deliver the goods” 
increased considerably. Secondly, reaching an agreement on commonly defined 
indicators for social inclusion was one of the top priorities of the 2001 Belgian 
Presidency of the EU
6 (Belgian Presidency of the EU, 2001: 23-31), and thus it was 
inconceivable for the Belgian President of the Council of the EU (Social Affairs 
formation), minister Frank Vandenbroucke, that his country would not be able to be 
part of the new statistical tool which would deliver the substance of indicators on 
social inclusions. Remember that Vandenbroucke wanted to reach an agreement on a 
set of indicators at the ‘Laeken European Council in 2001
7. 
 
Vandenbroucke therefore instructed his cabinet to resolve this situation as soon as 
possible. In spite of efforts made in 2001 and 2002 both at the political and technical 
level, the disputes between the national statistical institute and Eurostat continued 
and the situation even got worse when in the summer of 2002 the University of 
Antwerp concluded, again, that the publication of the Belgian ECHP-data for the years 
1994-1999 was « hardly reasonable » in view of the many remaining problems with 
validity. Thus, by the end of 2002 this seemingly technical discussion became a real 
political problem for the Belgian Minister for Social Affairs, but also for the Vice Prime 
Minister, Johan Vande Lanotte, who was also Minister for Social Integration. There are 
three reasons for this.  
 
First, at the end of 2002, the Commission confirmed that the “structural indicators on 
social cohesion” of the 2003 “Spring Report” would consist of a selection of the 
Laeken indicators. In other words, if Belgium continued to challenge (and block) the 
Belgian ECHP-data, Belgium would have been be the only Member State with nothing 
but “missing values” in the Spring Report with regard to social inclusion indicators. In 
                                         
6 The Belgian Presidency of the EU commissioned an in-depth methodological research for this specific 
purpose (see Atkinson et al., 2002). 
7 The report on indicators for social inclusion prepared by the Social Protection Committee and 
endorsed in Laeken can be found on the web-site of Directorate General Employment and Social Affairs 
of the European Commission (www.europa.eu.int). 
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fiercely to obtain full consistency between the Laeken indicators and the Structural 
indicators used in the Spring Report, this was an unacceptable perspective. Secondly, 
the ongoing dispute with Eurostat started to cast some doubts on whether Belgium 
would really be able participate, from the very beginning, in the ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’ between six Member States
8 as well as in Norway that would launch EU-
SILC as from in 2003, before it was formally enlarged to all Member States (Atkinson et 
al, 2005:  107). Thirdly, in case of non-agreement about the poverty and social 
exclusion indicators, it would have become very difficult for Belgium to use 
(contested) the Laeken indicators in the 2003 National Action Plan on social inclusion, 
while it had been pushing other Member States to do exactly that. 
 
Thus, both the Vice Prime Minister and the Minister for Social Affairs instructed their 
cabinet members, during the second half of 2002, to boost discussions and 
negotiations between Eurostat and the competent Belgian authorities. As a result, a 
compromise was reached in November 2002, after which the Belgian ECHP-data were 
released. Note that as a result of the recalculations made by Eurostat at Belgian 
request, the risk of poverty rate decreased by no less than 2%, which constituted very 
important corrections, as the University of Antwerp had claimed for some years. Apart 
from solving a year-long deadlock over the level, validity and interpretation of Belgian 
poverty indicators, (the perspective of) Belgium’s participation in EU-SILC had other, 
more institutional implications. So as to ensure that Belgium would be able to live up 
to its EU-SILC obligations, the national statistical institute decided to boost its own 
statistical capacity, so that the collection of social data could be organized by the NIS 
itself, as is the case at this moment. In sum, it seems that the legal obligation, 
deriving directly from the SPSI OMC (the Action Programme more particularly), to 
collaborate in EU-SILC had a major impact on statistical capacity building in Belgium.  
 
b.  Precision: target-setting as a new feature in Belgian social policy-making 
 
In the first round of NAPs/inclusion, submitted in 2001, only a minority of the then 15 
Member States included outcome targets.  The impetus for an enhanced role for 
targets in the next round of NAPs/inclusion came from the March 2002 Barcelona 
European Council: “The European Council stresses the importance of the fight against 
poverty and social exclusion. Member States are invited to set targets, in their 
National Action Plans, for significantly reducing the number of people at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion by 2010.” (European Council, 2002: 9). To a large extent 
this insistence on targets proved effective: even though there was wide variation 
across the 15 EU members in the way they responded to the Barcelona European 
Council invitation to set targets in their 2003 NAPs/inclusion, overall there was 
certainly a greater emphasis on targets than in the first round, and a number of 
Member States set targets in terms of the Laeken common social inclusion indicators 
(Atkinson et al, 2005:153). 
 
                                         
8 Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Austria. 
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And yet, there was one notable exception. Indeed, it came as some surprise to most 
European partners that Belgium was the only Member State which did not integrate 
any quantified target in its 2003 NAPIncl (European Commission, 2004:40). After all, 
Belgium was definitely one of the most outspoken supporters, and arguably among the 
architects, of the Barcelona European Council Conclusions with regard to this issue. 
Maybe even more remarkable is that the same 2003 Belgian NAP/inclusion does 
explicitly discuss the rationale for the approach it adopts to target-setting. Thus, the 
Plan: 
 
“[…] states that the experience of other Member States (such as the Netherlands, the 
UK and Ireland) shows that formulation of global and central targets is not 
straightforward. For this reason, the Belgian plan has decided to work with specific 
targets, which have the advantage that they are more concrete and can be more easily 
attained by specific policy instruments, and are thus easier to address. […] The Belgian 
Plan does not then set out a list of the specific targets set, and the subsequent 
discussion relates to policy measures being implemented. So although the arguments 
for setting various and concrete targets are articulated, no targets are in fact set out 
(Atkinson et al, 2005: 155). 
 
From a Belgian perspective it was perhaps not so surprising that in spite of the lip 
service paid to the importance of precise targets, they were not included in the 
second round of NAPs. The reason is actually quite simple: no political agreement 
could be reached on the targets, and this has everything to with the operation of the 
principle of subsidiarity within  the Belgian context. Regions and Communities are 
basically competent for important aspects of social welfare, eg with regard to social 
housing, worker placement and some aspects of unemployment policies, personal aid 
(child protection, disabled persons) and some aspects of health care (hospitals, 
prevention).All social security aspects (family allowances, pensions, child benefits, 
health care and unemployment insurance) as well as labour market policies and the 
management of industrial relations remain centralised at the federal level (Beyers and 
Bursens, 2006: 1070).  
 
Importantly, the design of most policies areas is further complicated by the Belgian 
institutional setting which is characterized by the fact that even in those areas with 
subnational competencies, framework rulemaking remains federal in most of these 
areas (Hooghe, 2003). One example can illustrate this: housing compentences are 
shared by federal and regional authorities – price regulation as well as fiscal incentives 
being a federal issue and quality standards a regional one (Groenez and Nicaise, 2004: 
11).In other words, for an agreement on almost any quantified target in the area of 
social policy, unanimous agreement is needed between 5 different governments which 
are one equal footing, since the federal government has no superiority over the 
subnational levels. 
 
Thus, for some it came as a considerable surprise that in the most recent National 
Action Plan on Social Inclusion 2006-2008,  Belgium did in fact propose a wide set of 
quantitative targets, for each of the policy priorities, from now up to 2010, with 
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“difficult” policy areas in view of the internal division (or rather: sharing) of 
competencies described above. Thus, targets are included with regard to housing and 
education, both of which are mainly subregional competencies, but with important 
federal involvement. It is important to note that the NAPIncl sets overall “Belgian” 
targets, and not subregional ones. The importance of “Belgian” targets being applied 
to subnational competencies cannot be underestimated: apart from the fact that “it is 
the first time that Belgium commits itself formally to explicit targets with regard to 
the fight against poverty” (Interview José Goris and Sophie Mollinghen, 2007), it is 
widely acknowledged that pursuing these national targets is only possible through 
increased coordination of regional policies, which is not evident given the institutional 
context.  
 
According to the President of the Flemish ‘Network of associations where the poor 
take the floor’, which plays an increasing role in the preparation of the NAPIncl
9, 
there is no coincidence involved: “the Network has insisted to find agreement on 
targets in policy areas with shared competencies [between federal and regional level, 
BV], since it is in those policy areas that deadlocks arises because of lack of 
coordination (Interview Ludo Horemans 2007). In other words, targets in well-chosen 
policy areas become an additional strategic argument to better coordinate those 
policies. On the other hand, as a consequence of target setting, the regions and the 
federal government seem to be developing a keen interest in what the other entities 
are doing in the concerned policy area, possibly because they realize that if the other 
entities do not reach their subnational targets, this means that the national target will 
be missed as well (cf. next section on “Delegation”).  
 
Some of the key actors involved in the Social Inclusion OMC already see some impact 
of the precise targets that were agreed. Thus, the national coordinator of the Belgian 
NAP claims that “with regard to social housing the National Action Plan clearly 
highlights that the numbers need to increase. After the European Commission’s 
recommendations to Belgium in the Joint report, social housing became an issue of 
discussion in Flanders. The minister for housing (Mario Keulen) was questioned by the 
media, the sector, the Flemish Parliament: what will you do to increase social housing 
as you announced in the Plan” (Interview José Goris and Sophie Mollinghen, 2007). The 
same interviewee expects that this kind of pressure will increase in the future, as 
more national actors start discovering the targets: “If an organization defends a 
certain interest, it now has an official source to say, in 2010 or sooner, ‘this has not 
been realized, in spite of promises made’” (Ibid). 
 
According to many actors involved in the SPSI OMC “the European strategy has helped 
to be more concrete” (Interview Ludo Horemans 2007). A telling example of this is the 
recent increase of the minimum income for elderly people, “GRAPA” in French (since 
December 2006). The Belgian Minister for Pensions, Bruno Tobback explains that:  
                                         
9 Namely through the ‘Task Force Actions’ in which different stakeholders and experts are represented 
and which prepares the NAPIncl, together with the ‘Task Force Indicators’. 
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“Sometimes the OMC can be usefully applied in the national debate. For example, we 
legitimized the increase of the GRAPA by pointing out that that the benefit levels were 
below the European risk of poverty line. By arguing that the GRAPA needed to attain 
the level of this poverty norm, we were able to increase the minimum income for some 
70.000 people with between 60 and 90 euros every month. This is a significant increase 
of more than 10 percent […]. This measure will cost around 70 million euros every 
year. The European poverty norm allowed to defend an increase for a well-defined 
target group (poor elderly) against which hardly anyone could resist. The government 
also decided that the GRAPA will, from now on, be structurally linked to the evolution 
of the general living standard. This has not been laid down in law, but it seems unlikely 
that anyone would dare to turn back the clock, since some would say that the 
government would ‘push’ these old people back under the risk of poverty line” 
(interview Bruno Tobback, 2007). 
 
According to the deputy head of cabinet of the Belgian Minister for Social Integration, 
the European risk of poverty norm acquired a broader mobilizing character: 
 
“it has become widely accepted. It is a substantive argument in budgetary negotiations 
to say: “we are not being generous to the poor”. In order to determine whether people 
are entitled to free legal assistance, the European risk of poverty norm is also the 
relevant criterion now. References to European norms, and EU-SILC calculations, have 
become frequent in policy discussions and documents (interview Johan Vandenbussche, 
2007). 
 
And it seems that this will not change in the near future: poverty organizations will 
“thoroughly exploit the measure to increase the minimum income for the elderly to 
the European poverty norm. After all, the same reasoning could be followed for other 
target groups, like younger people living on minimum welfare benefits, persons living 
on minimum unemployment benefits etc. For us the GRAPA case is an important 
precedent to say: “the minim income levels of all these income groups should be 
raised to the European poverty norm”. We were stunned to find this argument in the 
NAPIncl” (interview Ludo Horemans 2007).  
 
Finally note that in the run-up to the federal elections in June 2007 another OMC-
indicator was strategically used, thereby ending up into the core of political debates, 
when the President of the Flemish social-democratic party (sp.a) suddenly declared 
that one of the key priorities of his party during the following legislature would be “to 
increase the average replacement rate of pensions to 70 percent of the last net 
wage”. The proposal was launched after some of the President’s advisors had drawn 
from the pension-OMC indicators that Belgian (theoretical) replacement rates is, on 
average, 62%. The Belgian Minister for Pensions confirms that “the theoretical 
replacement rates which are calculated in the context of the pensions OMC are 
strategically used to make the stakes of the elections more concrete, and to to aim 
high. The political goal is: a strong addition investment in our pension system” 
(interview Bruno Tobback, 2007). 
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targets, have been used, at least in Belgium, to set more concrete policy objectives, 
or, in other words, to reduce the scope for reasonable interpretation. Targets give 
both the Commission and national actors a tool to check whether the goods have 
actually been delivered, and they are giving rise to increase coordination mechanisms 
(cf infra). And certain indicators (eg risk of poverty) are being strategically used in 
policy/budgetary debates. 
 
c.  Delegation: strengthening the federal policy arena 
 
In its evaluation of the social inclusion and pensions OMC’s, the European Commission 
noted that “Several countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland) stress that 
they took advantage of pre-existing coordination and consultation arrangements to 
prepare their NAPs, in some cases developing them further. For instance, Belgium uses 
federated structures but has added actions and indicator task forces to prepare and 
follow up the NAP” (European Commission, 2005:  21-22). Beyond the observation that 
all federated entitities, both (economic) regions and (cultural/linguistic) communities 
are being involved in drafting the NAPs, it seems especially worth noting that all of 
the coordination mechanisms are being steered by federal administrations. 
 
Thus, the abovementioned “Actions” and “Indicators” Task Forces are being prepared 
and presided by federal civil servants, from the federal Social Integration and Social 
Security Administrations, respectively. Furthermore, as regards evaluation, a specific 
on-line monitoring instrument for the NAPincl has been set up by the federal Social 
Integration administration. Also “The federal administration has proposed the 3 
priorities for the last NAPIncl, which were inspired by the EU-level. We have more or 
less steered the decision-making in this direction, prepared the meetings in this sense. 
There have been discussions about why other priorities (for example debt) were not 
taken into consideration, but in the end everyone accepted our proposal (Interview 
José Goris and Sophie Mollinghen, 2007). Finally, the federal administration is also in 
charge of the bi-annual Conference during which the OMC/NAPIncl is being discussed 
with a wide variety of actors, and which has recently taken the shape of an “internal 
Belgian peer review”(cf. infra).  
 
This new role for the federal administration has not gone unnoticed to most of the 
actors: “the Federal Social Integration Administrations keeps track of the 
implementation records, co-ordinates the NAP. The federal level thereby regained a 
better overview over the poverty policies of the Regions and the Communities. You 
could speak of a ‘light steering effect’ or a ‘more active coordination’ than in the 
past. The Regions have changing moods about this situation. Sometimes they see it as 
a burden, sometimes but they want to be part of it as well (Interview Johan 
Vandenbussche 2007). 
 
The federal administration itself seems to be clearly aware of this new situation: “as 
coordinator at the national level, we have to watch out: each regional government is 
autonomous, the federal government cannot impose anything on them (Interview José 
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administration interpreted its role very broadly: “at the political level, Belgium has 
always been in favor of those targets, but we did not manage to develop them for our 
own NAP. So the administration had to take its responsibility, and move faster than 
political decision-making. Until recently we just waited, but now we were forced to 
write our own proposal, based on the work of the Indicators Taskforce. We set up an 
internal benchmarking, so that each region would perform well on at least one of the 
targets. The day before the final (intercabinet( meeting we sent our proposal to the 
cabinet. It was agreed without discussion, and integrated in the NAP, we are not even 
sure they know what the agreed to” (Interview José Goris and Sophie Mollinghen, 
2007). 
 
In sum, it seems, first of all, that the SPSI OMC stimulates Regions, Communities and 
central government to cooperate. Secondly, the Communities and Regions seem to 
have delegated some authority with respect to coordination and follow-up of the OMC 
to the federal level. Thus, even in the absence of one single, overarching cooperation 
system with regard to EU social policies, it seems that the OMC keeps the federal 
government and the federal policy-making arena at the centre, even in a policy area 
that has been de-federalized to a very large degree (cf. infra). This finding confirms 
the general conclusions drawn by Beyers and Bursens (2006: 1073) that due to 
European integration the central government in Belgium remains an influential actor 
even with respect to issues that do not belong to its competences. And it confirms 
their finding that extensive (not minor) regional capabilities coincide with high (not 
low) level of cooperative behavior within Belgium (Ibid: 1074).  
 
So far I have discussed the effectiveness of the social protection and social inclusion 
OMC in terms of what has been referred to above as the ‘legalization’ dynamic. In the 
following paragraphs we will see whether this process also had an effect through a 
different kind of dynamic that has been referred to above as “new governmentalist”. 
Again, we consider 3 aspects: commitment, revision and participation. 
 
d.  Commitment: agenda-setting, increased coordination and monitoring 
 
The question is, first of all, whether the OMC has increased the subjective 
commitments of certain actors to ‘deliver the goods’. There seems to be some 
evidence that it has.  
 
First of all, most of the actors involved in this process, are convinced that the SI OMC 
keeps the fight against poverty high on the political agenda. Thus the coordinator of 
the Brussels Region part of the NAP, who is in general very skeptical towards the OMC, 
says that “”if the OMC were to be abandoned at  EU –level, I am not sure why the 
regional governments would continue to invest as much in this policy area. Sometimes 
I feel the OMC is only bluff, but then again I believe it has mobilized our 3 our 4 
governments to intensify the fight against poverty” (Interview Annette Perdaens, 
2007). Her Flemish counterpart confirms “Europe has played a role. Through a detour 
it leads to more attention to the fight against poverty: because there is attention for 
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actions. In general, the OMC gives you the impressions that you are part of something 
bigger because you know that they find it important as well. You meet people who 
really want to fight for it. You know, ‘La lutte’” (Interview Lieve De Grande, 2007).  
 
Secondly, there is clear evidence that the OMC has led to increased efforts to 
coordinate and streamline policy initiatives within each of the regions, which have, as 
discussed above, the bulk of the competencies in the fight against poverty and social 
exclusion. Different observers have pointed out that Brussels, Wallonia and the 
German Community only recently announced that they would start elaborating 
strategic poverty plans, and suggest that without the EU this might not have happened 
(yet). The coordinator of the Brussels Region part of the NAP seems to confirm this:  
 
“the new law of July 2006 announces a Brussels ‘Action Plan against Poverty’, which 
will probably be produced in 2008 for the first time. That is where you see an influence 
of the NAP. We decided to kill two birds with one stone: we will elaborate a real Plan 
for our own purpose, which will also be the Brussels contribution to the NAP. In that 
way, the work we did for the NAP since 2003 ultimately affected the Brussels Region: 
both the political and administrative level have been mobilized to do something much 
more structured, much more coherent, rather than continue to superpose measures” 
(Interview Annette Perdaens, 2007).  
 
Even though Flanders already made up a strategic ‘action plan’ in the fight against 
poverty before the launch of the OMC, some claim that the European process 
contributed to formalizing the commitment to involve a wide variety of actors in the 
process through a legislative act, i.e. a Flemish poverty ‘Decree’ which came into 
force as of 1 January 2004 (Interview Horemans 2007). 
 
According to one key actor the pressure coming from the OMCIncl to coordinate 
policies within Regions has another important consequence: it helps to bridge 
different “planning” approaches between the regions: “at the level of principles, 
Flanders has a real “planning” mentality, it favors governance by objectives, and is 
therefore in line with the European strategy. French speakers do this to a far lesser 
extent, it is an important cultural difference. It is no coincidence that the Flemish 
Action Plan was formalized as early as 2003, while Brussels will have to wait until 2008 
(Interview Annette Perdaens, 2007) 
 
A third “commitment” effect as a consequence of the OMC seems to result from the 
fact that policies are permanently being monitored, both by the EU and the national 
level. It was already mentioned above that a monitoring instrument for the NAPincl 
was set up by the federal Social Integration administration. The instrument contains 
follow-up data on the set of measures in the NAPs, on the federal as well as regional 
and community levels. At present, while extensive information is available for some 
measures, information on other measures is still scarce (Groenez and Nicaise, 2004: 
1). Even though far from perfect, this monitoring seems to create considerable 
pressure on those involved in policymaking: “the European process is our anchor point, 
sometimes we can say ‘we have to do this’, for example with regard to the 
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writing a plan, evaluation, monitoring, writing a new plan. And being questioned 
about why some things were not realized. The continuity of this exercise cannot be 
underestimated, the OMC certainly keeps us focused, and it shortens the policy cycle, 
even though politics is never a straight line. Our own monitoring system is sometimes 
being cursed by some of the actors, but it is an important tool since it allows to verify 
in a structured way who should do what by when with which budget. Of course we 
cannot ‘judge’ the others, in view of the Belgian institutional context, but it is still a 
way of confronting each other with the state of progress, or delay, of announced 
policies” (interview Johan Vandenbussche, 2007). 
 
e.  Revision: towards an ‘internal OMC’, a spirit of evaluation and priority to 
child poverty 
 
Another way of assessing the “impact” of the SPSI OMC is to look at instances where 
national actors have used the room for manoeuvre available to them to revise the 
institutional arrangements as they apply them. A striking example of such revision of 
the institutional context of the OMC seems is that this European process seems to have 
spilled over in an  internal learning process, between competent levels of decision-
making.  
 
Thus, the national coordinators of the Belgian NAP see an increase in interregional 
exchanges, and refer to “a kind of OMC within Belgium”, which is complemented by 
increased informal contacts between civil servants of regional and federal 
administrations (Interview José Goris and Sophie Mollinghen, 2007). Furthermore, 
“There are a number of examples of conscious learning from each other, between the 
regions. This is where you see the influence of the EU. In the Resource Centre
10 the 
Regions also exchange views between civil servants, but this was rather practical and 
not very frequent, and the goal was especially to work with the target group. The 
more coordinated way of working between the regions and the federal level emerged 
through the Actions Task Force which started working to prepare the NAP (Interview 
Lieve De Grande, 2007).  
 
The Director of the President of the Flemish ‘Network of associations where the poor 
take the floor’ confirms: “discussing each others policies, between regions, is a new 
feature in Belgian social policymaking” (Interview Ludo Horemans, 2007). Or, in the 
words of the Director to the Health and Social observatory of Brussels Capital:  
 
“it is the first time we really collaborate, even though formally speaking we should 
have done so since a law in 1998 obliged us to, but this was so far considered to be a 
luxury. It is the first time we want to work together between regions in a structural 
way, that we are motivated to do so and at the same time each of us notices slight 
modifications in the mentality of civil servants to start working in this direction as 
well. I think some see it as an internal OMC. In any case it seems to make more sense 
to find inspiration in the practices and policies of other regions, within Belgium, than 
                                         
10 Resource Centre for the Fight against Poverty, Precariousness and Social Exlusion. 
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country” (Interview Annette Perdaens, 2007).  
 
The Deputy Head of Cabinet of the Minister for Social Integration provides insight in 
the actual mechanisms of the “internal learning process”: “the Flemish see what the 
Walloons write in their Plan, and wonder why they could not do something similar. 
There is a permanent pressure that pushes us forward. If nothing happens in Flanders 
around debt settlement of socially excluded while progress is made in Wallonia, social 
organizations pick this up from the NAP, they organize pressure. In principle this could 
also happen without the OMC, but the number of places where there is a wider view 
on the whole country and where exchange of ideas are possible, are becoming scarce. 
It is important that we hold on to them, certainly now that the process is clearly 
deepening: first all energy went to writing process the details, now it is clearer who 
the actors are, they require certain legitimacy.  As a consequence, there is more room 
for substantial discussions now, we can be a bit sharper towards each other, now that 
we know each other and know what to expect. We do not have to evaluate each 
other, but still we can tell each other what we find good, and what we like less. We 
can do so, because people feel safer now, we have learned to trust each other 
(interview Johan Vandenbussche, 2007).  
 
A second case of ‘revision’ of the institutional arrangements while they are being 
applied has to do with the follow-up of policy initiatives. Thus, senior civil servants of 
the federal Social Integration administration claim that: “So far, the existing 
instruments and institutions (the Resource Center etc.) issue recommendations, but 
rarely verify what happens to them in policy terms. Let alone that the government 
itself would reflect upon what it realized as compared to the promises it made. This 
new policy phase, of monitoring and evaluation, has now been created in Belgian 
social policymaking through the OMC/NAP, also because it is a continuous process. We 
can now say: of all the measures that have been announced in the NAP 2001/2003, 
80% has been put into place, and 20 has not. We would now like to do this in a very 
systematic way now, and we have the tool to do it, but so far we are faced with some 
important technical flaws” (Interview José Goris and Sophie Mollinghen, 2007). 
 
As we have shown in the previous section, many actors do indeed perceive this 
monitoring system as pressure, as it strengthens their subjective commitment. In 
other words, it seems that certain actors have successfully revised the institutional 
setting so as to push forward a ‘spirit of evaluation’ in Belgian social policymaking. 
Even though technical and other obstacles still seems to impede a thorough evaluation 
of the implementation of many of the measures, it seems that at least a the mental 
level the OMC has helped to create a revolution in this respect. 
 
A third, more substantive example of actors having to learn what problem they are 
solving through the very process of problem-solving, is the choice of child poverty as 
one of the policy priorities in the Belgian NAP/Inclusion 2006-2008. This first of all 
illustrates the growing influence of Europe and the OMC on the Belgian social inclusion 
agenda: prior to the appearance of child poverty in this NAP, child poverty was not 
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c h i l d r e n  l i v i n g  i n  p o v e r t y  w e r e  a l m o s t  invisible in the Belgian social inclusion 
discourse. The President of the Flemish ‘Network of associations where the poor take 
the floor states: “we are skeptical about this focus on child poverty. Why would we 
accentuate certain target groups, and not certain others. But the pressure from the 
EU was obvious. The governments and the Working Group simply settled for it” 
(Interview Ludo Horemans, 2007). A political advisor: 
 
“I note the fact that child poverty is now one of our 3 priorities in fighting poverty, 
which is confirmed by a recent Resolution by the Senate on this issue which was also 
inspired by a UNESCO report. Child poverty has become an issue in Belgian politics and 
it will start to direct social inclusion policies. If a message is repeated long enough in 
the right places, amongst others by the UK in this case, it will end up on the agenda 
anyway. The fact that this issue is now in our NAP proofs that the OMC is used to set 
national policy agenda’s” (interview Johan Vandenbussche, 2007). 
 
At least as interesting as the agenda-setting effect itself, is that certain actors very 
quickly saw the advantages of the new focus. Thus, the federal Social Integration 
administration proposed to set targets with regard to combating child poverty, which 
requires the follow-up of measures in many different areas, and this further 
strengthens the role of the federal government. Also, “the Network will use the 
European focus on child poverty to demand thorough measures. This is a sensitive 
issue after all children cannot be blamed for being poor, so this provides us with many 
opportunities” (Interview Ludo Horemans, 2007). At the same time it seems that 
Belgium, while performing rather well in terms of child poverty, seems to be 
discovering that it may have underestimated the problem load of certain specific 
aspects of the problem, such as teenage pregnancies. More generally, it is 
acknowledged that there are a number of blind spots in the knowledge about this 
issue, also because the search for indicators has only started after it was decided to 
select child poverty as a priority in the NAP. In sum, it seems that “child poverty” has 
been catapulted from the OMC into the Belgian political arena, and that surprisingly 
quickly some of the key actors revised their attitude towards it, discovering new 
opportunities while learning more about the problem, and thus the solutions they 
should develop.  
 
f.  Participation: from teacher to pupil 
 
At the start of the Social Inclusion OMC in 2000, Belgium was rather confident about 
the way it had organised stakeholder involvement in the social inclusion process, and 
it was considered that Belgium represented a “model” in this respect, which could be 
a source of inspiration for other Member States. Thus, during its Presidency of the 
European Union, the experience (notably in Flanders) of involving not only the 
organisation representing the poor, but the social excluded themselves, was brought 
to the EU level. This was done through the organisation, hosted by the Belgian 
Presidency with the reluctant support of the European Anti-Poverty Network, of a first 
European meeting of people experiencing poverty. One would think that under such 
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any significant impact at the national level.  
 
And yet, as one can read from the evaluations of the first Belgian NAP/Incl, it seemed 
that the Belgian ‘model’ involvement of stakeholder looked much better on paper 
than in practice. In response, as mentioned above, Belgium set up, in view of the 
preparation of the second NAPIncl an “Actions” and an “Indicators” Task Force for the 
preparation and follow-up of the NAP. Both the federal and regional level are 
represented, as are stakeholders of local administrations, representatives of both 
sides of industry (National Labour Council), academics and associations of the poor.  
 
This somewhat improved the effective involvement, but not drastically: for the second 
NAP/Incl. “the consultation with other stakeholders (including associations 
representing the poor) has been fairly extensive”, but  “time was lacking for the other 
stakeholders to review and debate the preliminary draft of the NAP 2003-2005” 
(Groenez and Nicaise, 2004: 2-3). Furthermore, referring to the evaluation process the 
‘Flemish Network of associations where the poor take the floor’ expressed its “regret 
at the indolence of the government. The inclusion into the new NAP of the practical 
guidelines for a more permanent and systematic participation of grassroots 
associations in the policy process was considered to be a government commitment. 
The government however, did not live up to this commitment” (Ibid: 3). 
 
The Belgian government admitted that whereas “consultation and involvement has 
increased as the process has developed […] and real progress had been made, 
mobilisation has only been partly successful and there is much still to do (European 
Commssion, 2005: 22). According to most observers, this second ‘cold shower’ led to a 
real improvement of the stakeholder involvement at the beginning of 2005. A key 
actor recalls that:  
 
“The federal administration had organized a conference at the beginning of 2005 to 
evaluate the NAPIncl, but it turned out that no-one actually knew the NAP. So we 
never got to evaluation, but the conference had as strong mobilizing effect. Whereas 
involvement had already improved, through the setting of the “Actions Task Force”, it 
was still rather poor. Now, all of a sudden there was lots of interest for the Plan, from 
Public Centers for Social Welfare, from trade unions etc. And most of them wanted to 
stay on board afterwards, so the preparation and follow-up of the NAPs was changed: 
technical issues were from then onwards discussed by a “Technical Task Force” of civil 
servants, so that the “Actions Task Force” could have genuine thematic meetings at 
least 4 times a year, with a wide variety of actors. This is working well now: the third 
NAPIncl was discussed 4 times. We consider this to be a good practice in terms of 
preparation: third time, good time in terms of actor involvement” (Interview Ludo 
Horemans 2007). 
 
In sum, the way stakeholders were involved in the preparation of the NAP/Incl 
matured step-by-step, and Belgian authorities learned that their ‘participatory model’ 
(which they wanted to ‘upload’ to the EU level) could be much improved. The fact 
that they actually did adapt their ways of doing things is no coincidence: “there are 
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requirement to involve a wide variety of organizations in anti-poverty policy 
(interview Johan Vandenbussche, 2007). Others conform that “the sector of 
organizations where the poor take the floor use the reference to participation in the 
NAP/Incl, underline the fourth Nice Objective about the mobilization of the actors 
over and over again. They may not read the NAP, but they will use it to obtain 
subsidies if they can. ‘Mobilization’ works as leverage, a powerful argument. Which is 
used if it suits them” (Interview José Goris and Sophie Mollinghen, 2007). 
 
Finally, three important potential future developments are reported. Firstly, there are 
indications that the described NAP coordination structures (ie the “Indicators” and 
“Actions” Task Forces) are slowly replacing pre-existing coordination mechanisms, 
such as the Inter-Ministerial Conference (IMC), which meets irregularly, a tendency 
that is strengthened because the civil servants who were in charge of preparing the 
meetings of the IMC are in charge of the coordination of the OMC process. Secondly, 
some profound changes seem to be taking place in Wallonia, where the NAP process is 
being steered by an ‘interdepartmental working group’ which was installed from the 
elaboration of the first NAP. Importantly: 
 
“Until recently, this working group did not include any other than ‘political’ players, 
but the Walloon Combat Poverty Forum drew inspiration from its Flemish counterparts, 
which have been structurally involved in the NAP for a long time, and is now being 
invited to participate in the meetings. It seems that the Combat Poverty Forum will 
soon be entitled to structural funding as well. In this way the OMC may provide 
stakeholders with a place in policymaking they never obtained before (Interview José 
Goris and Sophie Mollinghen, 2007). 
 
Thirdly, note that the Belgian National Labour Council, the tripartite body that brings 
together the ‘two sides of industry’ is lobbying, at this very moment, so as to obtain a 
seat during the national preparations of the Social Protection Committee meetings 
(Interview Jean-Paul Delcroix). It remains to be seen whether this will effectively 
boost the involvement of trade unions and employers in the OMC. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The ‘puzzle’ this paper  attempted to address was the contrast between the outright 
sceptical views with regard to the OMC held by recent mainstream academic literature 
and the continued support for this method from many of the actors involved. A first 
conclusion is that there seems to be quite bit of support for our key hypotheses, 
namely that these actors perceive this ‘soft’ mode of governance rather as a rather 
useful tool, which has real effects, such as the spill-over of the European OMC into an 
internal Belgian type of OMC, which is seen as a major step forward by most key 
actors. Besides this there is evidence that, in spite of the fact that Belgium considered 
itself as a model with regard to actor involvement, participation practices have 
changed in important ways. Furthermore, new policy priorities (like child poverty) 
have been forced to the political agenda. While coordination has increased within 
each of the Regions (which have most of the competencies in the area of poverty and 
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of its limited competence in this policy area. A spirit of evaluation and assessment 
represents a landslide change in Belgian social policy making, even though the actual 
practice still represents many difficulties. Finally, the level of ambition has been 
increased, through boosting statistical capacity and introducing target setting on a 
variety of issues.  
 
At first sight, those who claim that the OMC is ‘weak and ineffective’ may have to 
reconsider, or be more specific about their claims: some of the changes that we claim 
to be linked to the OMC can hardly be described as insignificant, and clearly constitute 
more than ‘rhetoric or cheap talk’. Similarly, this empirical evidence sheds some 
doubts about the distinction that is often made between the effectiveness of ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ law: it seems that the effectiveness of the OMC can best be explained by 
combining the ‘legalization’ and ‘new governmentalist’ pathways described in Section 
1.  
 
Clearly, more research is needed to shed light, for example on the time dimension: 
the above analyses has made it clear that some of the effects of the OMC simply take 
considerable time, for example because actors need to build trust amongst themselves 
before they can start assessing each others policies in a more direct way. This 
framework for measuring the effectiveness of the OMC also call for a nuanced 
judgement vis-à-vis different OMCs: in this paper, the ‘empirical test’ was applied 
mostly to the Social Inclusion strand of the Social Protection and Social Inclusion OMC, 
but it seems that quite different result would be obtained if a similar exercise would 
be applied to the pensions or healthcare strands of the same process, or to other 
OMC’s such as the European Employment Strategy or Economic coordination. Indeed, 
one could hypothesise important variations in the level of obligation, precision, 
delegation, commitment, revision and participation between them. In this 
perspective, generalisations about “the (in)effectiveness” of the  OMC should be 
avoided.
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